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Abstract
Networked power grid systems are susceptible to a phenomenon known as
Coherent Swing Instability (CSI), in which a subset of machines in the grid lose
synchrony with the rest of the network. We develop network level evaluation
metrics to (i) identify community substructures in the power grid network, (ii)
determine weak points in the network that are particularly sensitive to CSI, and
(iii) produce an engineering approach for the addition of transmission lines to
reduce the incidences of CSI in existing networks, or design new power grid
networks that are robust to CSI by their network design. For simulations on a
reduced model for the American Northeast power grid, where a block of buses
representing the New England region exhibit a strong propensity for CSI, we show
that modifying the network’s connectivity structure can markedly improve the
grid’s resilience to CSI. Our analysis provides a versatile diagnostic tool for
evaluating the efficacy of adding lines to a power grid which is known to be prone
to CSI. This is a particularly relevant problem in large-scale power systems, where
improving stability and robustness to interruptions by increasing overall network
connectivity is not feasible due to financial and infrastructural constraints.
Keywords: power system simulation; community structure; network fault
tolerance; stability
Introduction
Disruptions of power grid systems can have a severe, negative impact on perfor-
mance and lead to Coherent Swing Instability (CSI) [1, 2, 3], whereby a subset of
machines in the grid lose synchrony with the rest of the network, thus shutting
the entire network down and leading to unacceptable blackouts. CSI is in essence a
manifestation of community structure in a networked system, a collective dynami-
cal divergence of one subgroup of nodal oscillations from another. Instigated by the
work of Girvan and Newman on modular structures in networks [4, 5, 6], a great
deal of attention has been devoted to the development of methods for identification
and characterization of modular components. Community detection has become a
broadly-defined term which is used to refer to a variety of such approaches. A
comprehensive review of its uses is presented by Schaub et. al. [7]. Much of the
prominent work in the field has focused on topological approaches, i.e. methods
which take as input an adjacency matrix describing a (weighted or unweighted, di-
rected or undirected) graph. As Schaub notes, however, dynamics on a network are
constrained by topology but cannot be fully described by it.
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This distinction has led to work on community detection methods which place
primary importance on dynamics. However, as many networks of interest lack a
known set of laws governing their evolution (e.g. neurological, social, transportation,
epidemiological, etc.), much of this research has modeled dynamics with Markovian
diffusion processes describing random flows on the network [8, 9, 10]. Power grids
have an advantage over these systems in that the physics of generator oscillations
and current transmission are well-understood: taken in isolation, each node of the
network behaves predictably. Only when they are combined on a complex and non-
symmetric graph structure do they begin to exhibit the group behaviors which
resist simple characterization. In this work we seek to capitalize on this property by
applying a dynamics-focused community detection perspective to simulation data
generated by a realistic, machine-level power grid model.
Previous work on applying network-topological analysis to real-world power grids
has met with mixed success. The extensive theoretical framework that has been
developed in the field of Complex Networks has given rise to a variety of meth-
ods which assess functional properties of power grids directly from their network
topology, using metrics such as node centrality, betweenness, degree distribution,
community structure, and clustering coefficients [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18].
However, topological methods alone have consistently failed to fully account for
observed network vulnerabilities [19, 20, 21, 22]. This has led to a variety of hy-
brid approaches which incorporate electrical properties of the system not captured
by its graph structure, often by using them to assign edge weights or to compute
modified versions of existing topological metrics [23, 22, 24, 20, 25]. The goal of
these studies has generally been to develop a heuristic to estimate a power grid’s
vulnerability to failure, which they then validate using historical data or numerical
simulations. In this work we present an alternative method which evaluates the
functional consequences of structural modifications directly from simulation data.
While this approach has previously been applied to steady-state systems [26], its
use for grid disturbances has generally been dismissed as infeasible due to the com-
binatorially large search space of possible faults and network structures [22]. Our
contribution is a methodology for incorporating topological properties (specifically,
community structure) and statistics on measurement data to significantly reduce
this space. Our technique identifies a set of candidate locations for single-line ad-
ditions to an existing network; this is a small structural perturbation relative to
the size of the full grid and therefore unlikely to significantly change its global
topological characteristics, such as degree distribution. Robustification occurs not
by directly tuning some topological (or hybrid topological/electrical) metric, but
rather by using such a metric to inform a minor structural modification. This lends
itself to practical engineering application, as it suggests an inexpensive change that
could be made to an existing grid rather than a design principle for the construction
of a new grid from the ground up.
Our data-driven approach is motivated by the proliferation of real-time monitor-
ing strategies for power grids that have been deployed in recent years [27, 28, 29],
with event location strategies gaining increasing attention in order to localize per-
nicious effects [30, 31, 32]. These strategies are directed to provide a system-wide
awareness of events such as faults and other disturbances, taking advantage of the
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increasing coverage of wide area measurement systems (WAMS) technology which
enables the implementation of wide area emergency and restorative control appli-
cations [30, 31, 32]. Even though these strategies have achieved positive results,
additional technical challenges arise as the modern WAMS-generated data become
high dimensional and more distributed thorough large areas of the system. We pro-
pose an additional technique for power grid network robustification. Specifically,
we show that the robustness of the network can be diagnosed from ensemble fault
simulations. Moreover, the power grid can be made significantly more robust to
disturbances with proper engineering of the network design and attention to the
community structure observed in instances of CSI. Such considerations are critical
in considering future power systems deployments, or for upgrading current networks
in order to circumvent susceptibility to CSI.
In this paper, we detail a simulation model used for characterizing the power grid
dynamics and disruptions. We further introduce a procedure for dynamics-based
community detection based on the results of these simulations, showing through
diagnostic tools that the network’s sensitivity to CSI depends on the location and
severity of a fault. This allows us to provide an engineering approach capable of
characterizing network connectivity modifications capable of robustifying the net-
work to decoherence.
Numerical Simulations of Power Grids
In this section, we highlight the numerical simulation architecture used to evaluate
power grid systems and their connectivity structure. Importantly, a prescription of
the disturbances applied to the network to induce CSI is considered in order to
evaluate the network robustness in a principled way.
The Power System Toolbox
Power grid simulations for this study were produced using Power System Toolbox
(PST), a Matlab software package originally developed by Kwok W. Cheung and
Joe Chow of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute [33]. Supplied with both the topolog-
ical structure of a power network and the specific electromechanical parameters of
the grid’s generators, nodes, and lines, PST performs dynamic simulations of both
steady-state and nonequilibrium dynamics. In this study we employ system fault
simulations structured as follows:
1 The system is initialized in a steady state for power flow through the network
by solving the nonlinear algebraic network equations which specify the load
flow problem.
2 The dynamic portion of the simulation is initiated by applying a transient
three-phase fault to a single line in the network, as though the line were
brought into momentary contact with a grounding object such as a tree.
3 When a fault occurs, power system protection equipment acts to isolate the
disturbance. If the fault is transient, the line can be reconnected after a short
time. PST treats this as a two-step process, clearing the fault first at the near
end and then at the remote end of the line. These two time intervals, labeled
in this paper as τ1 and τ2, are supplied as input parameters in simulations.
Figure 1 illustrates the two time scales, τ1 and τ2, for a simulation of the
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Figure 1 Power System Toolbox: Sample Simulation Stages of a grid simulation in PST: The
system is in a steady state until a fault is applied at 0.1s. The fault is cleared in two stages, at
0.15 and 0.2s. After the fault has been cleared, the system has been perturbed from its steady
state so it continues to evolve dynamically
northeastern power grid system. Our interest is in the dynamics following the
fault application and fault clearing time scales.
4 When the fault is cleared, the grid recovers its full original network structure.
The fault has perturbed it from its initial steady-state configuration, so dy-
namic evolution continues. We continue the simulation for a long time (relative
to the fault duration) and analyze the network’s response to the disturbance.
The CSI often is induced by a disturbance event (fault application) for which
the power grid system does not recover to its original stable (steady-state)
behavior.
The NPCC 140-Bus System
Simulations in this study are carried out on the NPCC 140-bus test system, which
is a reduced model based on the power grid of the North American northeast (Fig.
2). This network was chosen because its machine parameters are representative of
those in a major real-world grid and its graph structure is sufficiently large and
complex that it gives rise to coherent dynamics at subnetwork level.
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Figure 2 NPCC System Map The NPCC 140-Bus system is a reduced model for the power grid
of the northeastern United States and Canada, plotted here overlaid on a map of the region. In
this figure only, bus types are distinguished by the nodes’ symbols (circles are load buses, squares
are generator buses, and triangles are swing buses).
Discovering Community Structure in the Grid
Simulations of the northeastern power grid are sufficient to illustrate many of the key
features of power grid networks and their induced CSI. By perturbing the various
nodes of this specific network, we can characterize the instability structures, and
their commonalities, induced in the power grid dynamics.
Identifying Coherent Swing Instabilities
The focus of this specific study is the phenomenon of CSI, in which a subgroup
of buses which are strongly coupled to one another, but only weakly coupled to
other nodes, collectively lose synchronicity with the remainder of the network. Real-
world power systems implement controllers to damp the oscillations of relative rotor
angles which give rise to CSI, but no such safeguards are implemented in the PST
simulation toolbox. The onset of CSI therefore is manifested as a clear qualitative
transition in the dynamics of a subset of the buses. Specifically, a group of machines
will begin to oscillate with linearly increasing frequency while the remainder of the
network continues to evolve with dynamics on a slower and roughly constant time
scale (Fig. 3). Although the PST model does not accurately model the behavior
of the unstable network, since local controllers would activate to dampen growing
oscillations, it does highlight the lack of robustness of the network to the intrinsic
dynamics induced by the disturbances. By engineering a more robust system, the
intrinsic dynamics itself acts to stabilize the system. This aspect of engineering a
power grid network is considered below in the section entitled Engineering Network
Structure to Reduce CSI.
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Figure 3 Coherent Swing Instability CSI in numerical simulations: Plotting bus voltages shows
two qualitatively different types of dynamics. Each bus belongs to one of two coherent groups,
one of which varies at a slow, consistent time scale and the other of which oscillates with linearly
increasing frequency.
Community Detection
We begin by investigating the incidence of CSI by systematically applying faults to
each line of the network in succession and tracking which buses (if any) exhibit un-
stable dynamics as a result. The results, plotted in Fig. 4, suggest that the majority
of instabilities take place in a particular subgroup of buses. To formally charac-
terize this structure we approach it as a network community detection problem:
by treating the buses and fault locations as two disjoint populations of nodes with
(unweighted, undirected) connections given by the nonzero elements in Fig. 4, we
build a square adjacency matrix which casts the results as a bipartite instability
matrix (with (Nbus +Nline) rows and columns).
In this form, the results are amenable to any network-topological community de-
tection scheme desired. Results presented in this paper use the Adaptive BRIM
algorithm, developed by Michael J. Barber for modularity-based community de-
tection in bipartite networks [34]. Very similar results were obtained using other
bipartite algorithms, including those introduced in Newman (2008) [6] and Liu and
Murata (2009) [35].
The Adaptive BRIM algorithm detected 12 distinct communities from the bipar-
tite instability matrix. However, many of these were quite small. In the interest of
restricting focus to network-wide swing instabilities, communities containing fewer
than 2 buses or lines were reassigned to a neighboring cluster based on a vote of
graphical nearest neighbors. This led to a reduced population of 3 dominant com-
munities, plotted in Fig. 5.
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Figure 4 Unstable Buses Based on Fault Location A systematic exploration of the network
locations of unstable dynamics as a function of the line where the initial fault was applied. Each
column represents a different simulation with a different fault location, with yellow pixels denoting
which buses exhibited instability during that run.
The blue community, which corresponds geographically to New England, is a con-
tiguous and highly interconnected nodal group with few connections to the rest of
the network. A simple topological community detection scheme applied directly to
the NPCC-140 graph would almost certainly have identified it as a highly modu-
lar cluster. The purple group, however, is thoroughly embedded within the larger
black nodal population. This is a testament to the importance of our dynamics-
based approach to community identification: modular graphical structure does not
necessarily equate to dynamical coherency.
The Sensitivity of Network Connections
Given the diversity of dynamics observed for disruptions of the network, our analysis
aims to understand the sensitivity of each node in the power grid to fault tolerances.
By varying the fault severity, we can rank the nodes and their susceptibility to CSI.
Varying Fault Severity
To identify the lines where a system fault is most likely to generate CSI, we measure
responses to faults of varying intensity. Faults in PST simulations are parameter-
ized by two time durations: τ1 from the application of the fault to the clearing of
the near end, and τ2 from the clearing of the near end to that of the remote end.
Generally speaking, a longer fault duration drives the system farther from its ini-
tial steady-state configuration, increasing the likelihood of instability. Indeed, the
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Figure 5 Community Structure in CSI Results of Adaptive BRIM community detection on the
adjacency matrix of the bipartite instability graph. Small communities (containing fewer than 2
lines or buses) have been subsumed into neighboring clusters.
parametrization of faulty intensity through the (τ1, τ2) parameter space allows us
to characterize the robustness of each node.
Ranking Lines by Sensitivity
Working in (τ1, τ2) parameter space, we identify a domain which captures the onset
of instability for most fault locations. This gives a range of values broad enough so
that the lowest values of τ1, τ2 yield fully stable dynamics, while the highest values
of τ1, τ2 lead to instability at many fault locations. The precise choice of bounds is
somewhat arbitrary as long as they meet these criteria; the performance over the
specified (τ1,τ2) region will only ever be used as a relative metric for comparing
lines. For each fault location, we repeat simulations over a grid in this domain of
parameter space. The performance of each run is quantified by determining the
number of buses which go unstable.
The result of this analysis gives an “instability frontier” in the space of (τ1, τ2).
As visualized in Fig. 6, the more sensitive lines of the network (e.g. Fig. 6a) have a
frontier which extends farther down toward the bottom-left corner, whereas more
robust lines (e.g. Fig. 6b) are fully stable until comparatively high values of (τ1, τ2).
In the former case, we observe that a small perturbation to the fault parameters
can lead to a big jump in the number of unstable generators. This foreshadows the
crucial role of community structure in understanding this behavior: instability often
occurs collectively in coherent subnetworks.
Having performed exhaustive simulations for all possible fault locations, we rank
lines according to sensitivity by averaging over the unstable nodes obtained at
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Figure 6 Sample Instability Frontiers in Fault-Time Parameter Space Sample results of
simulations over a region of fault-time parameter space. Each box represents a simulation with
fault times (τ1, τ2), with its color denoting the number of generator buses which exhibited unstable
dynamics. A set of simulations like this was carried out for each line in the network. Examples are
presented for a) a fault location likely to induce CSI, and b) a fault location unlikely to induce
CSI. Note: the color scale is produced by ennumerating unstable generator buses (just those
marked by squares in Fig. 2) so a count of 9 corresponds to the whole New England subnetwork.
Figure 7 Fault Locations Susceptible to CSI Highlighted in red: the twenty most sensitive lines
of the network, i.e. those where a fault is most likely to induce CSI
all (τ1, τ2) parameter combinations. The numerical values obtained are of course
sensitive to our choice of the fault-time domain, but they serve as a functional metric
of comparison between different lines tested on this domain. Figure 7 illustrates
the results of this process, with the 20 most sensitive lines highlighted in red.
These are the lines whose performance we seek to improve through the remainder
of this study. The network modifications we consider in the next section belong
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to a combinatorially large space, so it is necessary to restrict the scope of our
analysis wherever possible to avoid having to do a prohibitively large number of
simulations. Restricting simulations to these “worst offender” fault locations allows
us to constrain the parameter space while still treating the cases which are of
greatest practical concern with respect to grid stability.
Engineering Network Structure to Reduce CSI
Although the specific criteria which lead a subgroup of buses to coherently desyn-
chronize in a given network are not generally well understood, it is clear that the
observed phenomenon of community structure is intimately related to the con-
nectivity configuration of the network. Grids are prone to CSI when they contain
a subnetwork which is relatively weakly coupled to its surrounding nodes. Thus
a naive approach to engineering network stability would be to simply add con-
nections between nodes inside and outside this instability prone community. The
results we present in this section not only support this intuition, but also show
that not all inter-community line additions yield significant improvements to sta-
bility. As such, the full simulation-based approach implemented here is necessary
to determine which inter-community connections contribute the most to the grid’s
structural robustness.
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Figure 8 Instability Frontiers of Modified Networks For each line addition considered
(connections highlighted in color on the left), the mean instability frontier of the unmodified
network (center, dotted black line) was compared to that of the network with the new connection
(right, solid red line). Some candidates afforded little to no improvement ((a), with added line in
orange), while others robustified the network so that it was resilient to considerably more severe
faults ((b), with added line in green).
Network Modification Protocol
The approach for assessing how the addition of a transmission line affects the inci-
dence of CSI is as follows:
1 A line connecting the two chosen buses (with resistance and reactance speci-
fications taken to be the median of those of the existing lines) is inserted into
the PST network specifications.
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2 For each of the most sensitive lines in the unmodified network (i.e. those high-
lighted in Fig. 7), simulations are carried out for all (τ1, τ2) fault-time com-
binations in the domain identified previously to obtain an instability frontier
(denoted in Fig. 8 by a black dotted line).
3 Overall performance for each fault location is again obtained by averaging over
the sum of unstable generators. These values are then averaged over all tested
fault locations to obtain a single plot of the modified network’s susceptibility
to CSI (shown in the right column of Fig. 8).
4 The result of this process is compared to that of the unmodified network to
obtain a ratio measuring the stability improvement afforded by the added
connection.
The set of possible single-line additions to the network is combinatorially large
(Nadditions = Nbus (Nbus − 1)−Nline = 19367, in the case of the NPCC-140 system).
The number of simulations necessary to carry out the above steps for a single net-
work modification is such that it is not computationally feasible to test all possible
cases.
We present results on a semi-randomly selected subset of these possibilities (“semi-
random” because they were chosen with a penalty on geographic distance between
the buses to be connected, so as to better conform to practical engineering consid-
erations). These candidates are separated into two groups: those which run between
two distinct communities, and those which are internal to a single community.
Network Modification Results
The candidate lines tested using the above protocol are pictured in Fig. 9, colored
according to their performance relative to the original network configuration. Ad-
ditionally, the distributions of the stability change parameter for each of the two
populations of line candidates are presented as histograms and box plots in Fig. 10.
a. Inter-Cluster Additions b. Intra-Cluster Additions
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Figure 9 Line Additions Colored by Contribution to Stability The NPCC 140-bus system with
colored lines representing candidates for additions to the network. Their coloring denotes the
extent to which they improved network stability relative to the original network. Green lines
afforded the greatest improvement, while red lines left performance largely unchanged. The
subnetworks obtained by community detection are colored in black, blue, and purple for reference.
Line additions have been separated into a) connections between distinct communities, and b)
connections within a single community
We observe that every line addition that significantly impacted the network’s sus-
ceptibility to CSI is one that connects two distinct communities. This suggests that
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Figure 10 Distributions of Stability Change Parameter: Inter- vs. Intra-Community
Distributions of stability impact parameter for a) inter-community connections, and b)
intra-community connections. From the histogram outliers and the spread denoted by the box plot
width, it is clear that the line additions between distinct communities are much more likely to
effect significant changes to network stability (positive or negative).
understanding the network’s community structure is crucial to identifying candi-
dates for new lines to robustify the grid. The search space of inter-community lines
is substantially smaller ( Nadditions =
1
2
∑Ncommunity
i
[
N ibus
(
N totbus −N ibus
)]−N interline =
4191, in the case of the NPCC-140 system, which represents a 79% reduction of
the search space). Coupled with practical distance considerations (and any other
logistical criteria such as local topography or infrastructure), the number of line
candidates for which this extensive simulation process must be carried out becomes
much more tractable.
Within the inter-community population of line candidates, the criteria for sig-
nificant robustification are not obvious. Examining the relationship between per-
formance and common topological metrics such as betweenness and degree cen-
trality reveals little to no correlation, which supports the literature consensus
[19, 20, 21, 22] that these measures are insufficient as predictors of behavior in
real power systems. Nonetheless, we have successfully identified a number of lines
which do offer a marked improvement even by testing a very small subset of all
possible inter-community connections. This shows that our approach to evaluating
robustness of the network can effectively identify potential connections capable of
robustifying the power grid network.
Conclusion
We propose a computational framework for the analysis of the network level dynam-
ics and stability of power system disturbances. Our analysis is critical for under-
standing how the network architecture itself can lead to subgraphs (communities)
that are highly susceptible to CSI. By systematically parametrizing disturbances
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according to the temporal parameters τ1 (the time of the fault until it is cleared)
and τ2 (from the clearing time of the near end to that of the remote end), we can
assess the effect of each node on the overall stability of the power grid network.
We specifically develop evaluation metrics to (i) identify dynamics-based com-
munity substructures in the power grid network, (ii) determine weak points in the
network that are particularly sensitive to faults, and (iii) produce an engineering
approach for the addition of transmission lines to maximally reduce the incidence of
CSI. For our example of the Northeast power grid, we identify a strong dependence
of line sensitivity on the New England subnetwork. We show how modifying the
network’s connectivity structure can robustify the network to CSI. The space of
possible connectivity changes is combinatorially large, so we restrict modifications
to a tractably small subset of single-line insertions to the original network. We show
that community detection can be used to substantially reduce this search space, as
line additions which connect separate communities tend to much more significantly
impact global stability. We find that the addition of a line can markedly improve
the grid’s resilience to CSI, but the success is highly dependent on location within
the network.
Our analysis provides a versatile diagnostic for the efficacy of adding a particu-
lar line to a power grid which is known to be prone to CSI. This is a particularly
relevant problem in large-scale power systems, where improving stability by increas-
ing overall network connectivity is not feasible due to financial and infrastructural
constraints. Our approach focuses principally on network topology, so its results
are fairly robust to small variations in the model parameters used in simulation.
This makes it a strong candidate for use in analyzing real-world power systems, as
connectivity structure is a characteristic which can be perfectly reproduced in the
translation from physical system to simulation model.
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